Monthly Archives: May 2014

RAMSGATE RNLI’s inshore and all-weather lifeboats were launched yesterday (May 30) to assist a yacht aground on the Goodwin Sands.

The 13m Belgian yacht, with five people aboard, was firmly aground on the Sands on a falling tide and could not be towed off.

The RNLI crew transferred the people to the all-weather boat in fairly calm seas and both lifeboats returned to Ramsgate.

To prevent the yacht becoming a shipping hazard the lifeboats launched again at 10.30pm as the tide was rising.

Th crew managed to tow the yacht, which was undamaged, off the Sands.

The lifeboats reached the harbour at 1.00am where the yacht was reunited with its crew.

Read more:

7th June 2014

Bands playing from 12:30pm until 11pm


White Cliffs Music

presents the

White  Cliffs Blues Music  Festival

Dover Kent
with free festival parking from 12noon in Albany Place car park
What’s on offer at Bluebirds:

          Licenced bar with real ales
          Food available: from burgers & chips to chillie & rice
          Separate dining room available
          Access facilities: lift to all floors / toilet
          Tables and seating around the room

also supports

Dover Music Festival

Friday 18th – Sunday 20th July 2014

Desperation clouds and clings to those who have other things

on their minds

One last act to gain an upper hand

To make what’s wrong right

For those that cling to things

May madness at the voting booth.

Cooo, all this political voting malarkey?

It’s hard to know what to do for best.

Some folks will vote for a party or individual regardless of reasons not to, and others will apply a lot of thought to the matter and then vote accordingly. Mummy allatsea doesn’t bother with any of that it seems. A lifelong pro-European and uber-fan of the EU (allegedly) she voted UKIP in the European election yesterday!! God help us. If that’s the logic being applied by other folks in any great numbers we’re, in the words of Private Fraser, ‘Doomed laddie, doomed.’ Obviously allatsea senior doesn’t get the irony of voting for a party led by a man who insists  he wants to be rid of the very gravy train on which he rides and grows fat on. Snout firmly in the European trough!! It is bizarre isn’t it. It’s like having a leader of something like the  ‘Anti blood sports society’ who spends his time shooting and killing animals for pleasure or a vociferous  anti-paedophile  activist going  on holiday to East Asia to abuse small children. It’s bollocks but, seemingly, a lot of people don’t see it that way. So much for home grown intellect.

On the subject of intellect and the power of thought, Margate Station.  Say what you like about its general shabbiness and bone idle staff but one thing that did work well there was the approach road, drop off point, taxi rank, roundabout and parking arrangement. It was wasn’t the best it could be and at peak times thanks to the general phuck-wittedness of some car drivers, it did get a bit chaotic for short periods BUT………………….it worked and it worked well. That fact  then beggars the question as to why those wott should know better  have spent months & months and  hundreds of thousands of parnds altering it to make it a completely ghastly twat-hell. Deep joy to use it is not. Realising ‘it’s not quite finished yet’ is no excuse, it’ll still be shite then too.

Madam allatsea has gone to Lundunn tarn for the day with a friend. Said friend, a pleasant lady it has to be said, is off up to the selection process in the smoke  to be a Lundunn Policewoman. All good so far but why madam allatsea going too? Wannabee lady Plod can’t take memsahib into the process can she? Indeed not, but she can take her along on the journey bit. Why? Cos she’s apprehensive about going on her own it seems! Well bugger me with a very long broom handle but I think there may be an issue of ‘imprudent career choice’ here. Blimey.

Brings back memories of allatsea’s time at London Array. There were quite a lot of chaps who were desperate to be ‘offshore technicians’.  The important word here is ‘offshore’, it implies that one will have to go from ‘shoreside’ to that watery stuff out there at sea, ‘offshore’. That involves (in this case) going out to site  by boat, boats move around a bit on the waves. Some folks are prone (it’s a physiological thing) to sea-sickness (and sea sea-sickness is not to be mocked, its debilitating and horrible) and at London Array this affected a small group of ‘technicians’. Once so affected, the crewboat, with up to 12 technicians on board, all destined for vital work offshore, was obliged to turn back to Ramsgate to land the ‘sicknotes’ before resuming the day’s work. This resulted in cost penalties (the boats burn 400 litres of fuel an hour and often two hours extra running time was incurred) and lost time due to the delay in getting the technicians to site. When however, after around a dozen aborted trips, we pointed out to the gentlemen concerned that perhaps they should re-visit their career choice, one that didn’t involve boat trips, say,  they were horrified. They  were under the impression that some kind of dispensation should be organised for them, eg only go offshore when the weather was very smooth.  Dickheads!!

Allatsea wanted to be paratrooper only he was frightened of jumping out of  flying aeroplanes and averse to being shot at. He decided it would be more prudent to go to sea instead. So he did. Job done, sorted. Do what you’re capable of, not what you’re not. It makes life for you and those around you, much, much  easier.


The need for 3rd party DP verification

Some ship owners/operators are  a bit more averse to parting with brass than others. A case in point recently with an operator (more accurately, charterer)  of a DP vessel who was miffed that the suitability and compliance folks wouldn’t accept the vessel’s DP FMEA (or indeed the Annual Trials Report) because they’d been produced in-house and not by a reputable third party. He fair threw his toys out of the corporate pram.

The folks wott  caused the furore responded thus.

Very erudite m’lud. Well done.

“Please note that the Underwriters of the project would expect  the client to follow best industry practice. The guidelines for DP vessels are written by IMCA so it would be expected that the client  follow IMCA guidelines. The application of IMCA guidelines for DP operations is outlined in the following extract from IMCA M103 Rev 1, Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels (our underlining):


In 1991, IMCA’s predecessor DPVOA (the DP Vessel Owners Association) first published Guidelines for the design and operation of dynamically positioned vessels, prepared by Global Maritime, with the reference

103 DPVOA. The guidelines represent a practical amalgamation of current regulations, operating procedures and good practice. They have been periodically reviewed and updated and are now published with the

reference IMCA M 103 (DPVOA merged with AODC to form IMCA in 1995).

In 1994, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee approved its own Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (Ref. 113 IMO/IMO MSC Circ.645), in conjunction with

implementation of paragraph 4.12 of the 1989 MODU Code as amended. Later versions of these DPVOA/IMCA guidelines have reflected the IMO document. While the IMO guidelines apply to new vessels with dynamic positioning systems constructed on or after 1 July 1994, no distinction is made between new vessels and those constructed prior to 1994 within this IMCA document.

1 Principles for All DP Vessels

Section 1 is applicable to all DP vessels. The principles should be met in full by all DP vessels.

1.1  Basic Philosophy

i) For the purposes of these guidelines a fully operational DP system is defined as one that is able to reliably keep a vessel in position when working up to the rated environment, such that the maximum excursion from vessel motions (surge, sway and yaw) and position control system accuracy (DP footprint) is equal to, or less than, half the critical excursion for the work being carried out.

ii) The DP control system should provide adequate information to operators such that any change of status of the DP system due to weather, equipment malfunction or operator action should be clearly indicated at the permanently manned position where corrective action is possible and where the limitation, if any, can be understood by operators. The indication should be such that the operator is unlikely to make a mistake in assessing the severity and effect of the status change.

iii) Safe working limits should be determined for each geographical location, expected environmental condition/force and type of task to be performed. These limits need to consider every failure mode defined by the FMEA and the likely time to restore position control, recover the divers, disconnect a gangway or riser or otherwise move clear of an area to return to a safe situation. In the case of simultaneous or close operations, failures on the other vessels also need to be considered.

Note: A ‘safe situation’ means one where the work has or could immediately cease with no serious consequences from position loss and the vessel is left in a state where operations can readily resume once the disturbance is corrected.

It should be possible for the performance and health of a system to be effectively monitored by suitably trained and experienced personnel without the need to interrupt the control process. Changing between the various modes of position control should be simple, secure and demonstrably effective in meeting the points i), ii) and iii) above.

The above basic philosophy should be applied to all the types of work the vessel is designed to undertake with careful consideration of the consequences of position loss. If continuous working means that the vessel is likely to work in a degraded state the new ‘safe working limits’ and ‘safe situation’ should be agreed by formal risk assessment. If it is not normal to continue working in a degraded status, but because of the particular circumstances on board it is considered safe to continue, then this decision should also be made after an operational risk assessment involving the key personnel responsible for the work and station keeping before a decision is made.

To help vessel owners/operators and their clients achieve the above philosophy three equipment classes for DP vessels have been defined by IMO (Ref. 113 IMO – Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (IMO MSC Circ.645)) which recommends that DP vessels built after 1 July 1994 be assigned an equipment class.”

Use of third parties in developing FMEAs is outlined in IMCA M 103 Rev 1 Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels, Section 1.3 (our underlining):

“DP vessels have to undergo FMEA proving trials, in addition to and after, dockside testing, commissioning and owner (customer) acceptance trials. The DP system should be proven as far as is reasonably practicable in all the normal modes of operation expected during the life of the vessel. When all normal modes of operation appear to be functioning correctly, failure modes should be simulated and the results of such tests documented, by a third party.

Independent witnessing of annual trials is outlined in IMCA M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels, Section 5.3 (our underlining):

“The operator shall arrange for the annual DP trials to be witnessed by a competent and independent person or persons.”

Go North young man, but you might might want to come back.

Peterhead on Friday, booked into the Waterside Hotel. Hmm, other guests included around 120 very drunk (either that or very stupid) septuagenarians on a weekend break and some pipe fitters from Tyneside. Once informed that said drunken old twats would be ‘dining’ in the hotel restaurant that night, the lure of a Lidls supplied picnic in the room seemed very very attractive. Before anyone points out that he could have gone somewhere else to eat, I’ll remind them that the location was Peterhead. Nuff said.

Anyway, that done and dusted, a 0630 saw the start of the suitability survey on the very fine and very new Norwegian ship. Everyone played the game and answered the questions and showed the documentation and opened the hatches and the lids and the doors that needed opening and all was well. Thank you crew of ship.

Into the hired Focus jamjar and down south for 50 miles to the western perimeter of Aberdeen and a Premier Inn. No grub available said the delightfully charming and attractive Polish receptionist, but you can eat at the Crocked Hat next door. Pop head out of door to have a gander at yon place.  Ugh. It’s a cross between a ‘Hungry Horse’ and a creche for heroin addicted scratters. Armies of traccy bottomed, football shirted, tattooed, loud , be-childrened mega trash out in force to devour troughs of onion rings and chips and onion rings and chips and onion rings and chips……. Alex Salmond would have so proud of his fine nation’s finest!! That said, it’s reminiscent of so much of modern Britain. Thank you New Labour, thank you Sure Start.


So, as yours truly has a physical aversion to being in the company of that kind of trash/scum/untermensch  he opted again for the cabin picnic. Down Mid Stocket Road to the COOP (cos they’re good with food…….but useless at everything else) and a bagful of chicken, tomatoes, wine and bread. Aah, wonderful.


Back in room, having threaded a safe passage through the thronged onion ring eaters, coincidentally, now even louder than before and, somehow, even uglier. Picnic devoured, time for bobos and dreams of anchor handlers and pre-lay systems. zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

Another early start the following morning, again a nice Norwegian ship, bright vivacious crew, well run, ordered, nice, reassuring,  high end, easy to audit. Why? Because it was high end and well manned. Good, thanks.


BA south to Heathrow, of course it’ll be a quiet flight on a Sunday. No it wasn’t, busy. Too busy. No hassle but not enjoyable. Landed on time.  Graham and car waiting. Home. Lovely. A day from 0500 to 2300, 18 hours, you get paid for eight. Shit deal really. Sigh.

Still, there’s always gin Surprised smile)

Nigerian Appeal

Hallo dear readers of this very informative blogging blog site place. If you are a reader of a blog, then, to my mind at least, you are a ‘bleader’ and I shall refer you to you as such for the rest of this extremely important broadcast to you people in ‘bleader’ land.

My name is Tulip Rosebud Ozollowawaa and I am a chief Prince in the Ibo tribe being resident in the town of Onne Harcourt in the Delta region of Nigeria. For many years my family, advisors,  body guards, spin doctors and Swiss financial consultants have been judiciously skimming vast amounts of the old Federal wonga off the top of the regional infrastructure development, healthcare and edukashunn budgets and putting it to good use at the Mercedes showroom, gentlemens clubs and beer halls of our fine nation. The lunatics in Abujah have no real grasp of the value of the readies and were sending us far too much to be wasted upon the oiks and chancers of the Delta. My team’s dedicated  approach to imposed frugality on the public at large has paid very very good dividends indeed my friends.  So much so that we need to export this carefully accrued dosh-pile to the stable and efficient world of Northern Europe. None of that European South Coast lot gonna get their hands on it that’s for sure. Them Spanish Italian Greek malarkey wallahs are not to be trusted. No indeed.

You British are the ones we want to make our wazooma safe and bigger. You slickers in the famous Lundunn City are masters at making rich men richer. I need your services. Unfortunately, there’s a bit of fly in the old ointment. Them suspicious fellows in Abujah have imposed a bit of a squeeze on the fine and bulging  Ozllowawaa’s bank account, citing malicious accusations of corruption and stealin’ and things of this false nature. You cannot trust them in Abujah. They’re too busy making excuses about these missing school girls and all that thing going off in the North of the country. They are not really understandin’ the needs of the Delta.

To this end my dear bleader I need to borrow your bank account to facilitate the immediate transfer of the our funds from these shores to yours. I realise this is a bit of an imposition, a bit of a ‘big ask’ as you cockernees say and as  a sensible man with his finger on the pulse of the way things are, I will make it very worth your while to do this thing. I will pay you one million of your Quinns pounds for this service. Just send me your sort code, account number, date of birth, name of wife and others, address, PIN and phone number and I will get the old process under way. To help matters along, to bribe these corrupt federal agents at this end, I will need some clean and untraceable Quinns pounds to get them to look the other way. Please send me, in cash, used tenner or twenties will be more better, ten thousands pounds to the followin’ place.

Ozollos Bush Bar, just by the container  quay at Onne Port,  Port Harcourt, Nigeria.


Thank you my friend.

Nor-Ocean Offshore reports that North Sea AHTS spot rates have fallen a little of late. “Following some weeks with rates at a healthy level, the spot softened last week. Average rates US$23k (62k) with US$112k (16k) seen on Norwegian side and US$26k (50k) on UK side,” said the broker. “Availability in the AHTS spot is currently high, with four vessels available on Norwegian side and a further 20 vessels available on UK side (utilization 65 per cent).”

Upturned seafire
However, the broker said it remained “bullish” on the AHTS market going into the summer season. “Limited supply growth and increasing rig activity and projects such as the Kara Sea campaign implies that the stars are likely to be aligned for owners of AHTS tonnage this summer,” it said. The key risk, said Nor-Ocean, is further sanctions against Russia, which potentially could hit Exxon/Rosneft’s Kara Sea campaign which is expected to absorb six large vessels from early June. Source : Offshore Shipping Online


Bourbon Dolphin

In this Summary the Commission provides a brief account of the accident itself and a summary reproduction of key conclusions of the report. For the record, the Commission would note that such certain nuances will be missing in such a summary.
1.1 The Accident
The “Bourbon Dolphin” was delivered to the company, Bourbon Offshore Norway, at the beginning of October 2006 by the shipyard Ulstein Group in Ulsteinvik, Møre og Romsdal county. The vessel was designated DP2 Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel, built and equipped to perform anchor handling, towing and supply operations in deep water. She had a gross tonnage of 2,974 tonnes, was 75.2 metres long and 17 metres wide. The vessel had a continuous bollard pull of 180 tonnes and a tension on the main winch of 400 tonnes. The vessel was put into operation immediately; up to the accident, she had completed 16 assignments.
From the end of March 2007 the “Bourbon Dolphin” was on contract to the oil company Chevron. The contract concerned anchor-handling in connection with the move of the drilling rig “Transocean Rather” on the Rosebank oilfield, west of Shetland.
The ocean depth in the area concerned is 1,100 metres. The rig is moored with eight anchors. The distance between the rig and the mooring positions was around 3,000 metres. The mooring lines were about 3,500 metres, of which about 900 metres was of 84 mm chain and about 920 metres of 76 mm chain, plus 1,725 metres of 96 mm wire. Deployment of anchors was done by means of the vessel running out the rig’s chain, connecting it to chain that the vessel had on board, whereupon the rig ran out wire. The anchor that was fastened to the vessel’s chain was thereafter lowered down to the seabed with the aid of the vessel’s winch and wire. During the last part of the deployment, another vessel participated by grabbing hold of (grappling) the chain so as to distribute the weight of the mooring and relieve the strain on the rig.
Around 09:00 on Friday 12 April 2007 the “Bourbon Dolphin” began to run out chain for the last anchor (no. 2). Around 14:45 all the chain was out. The “Bourbon Dolphin” then drifted considerably off the mooring line and asked the rig for assistance. The “Highland Valour” was sent to assist the “Bourbon Dolphin”, but did not succeed in securing the chain. The “Bourbon Dolphin” drifted eastwards towards the mooring of anchor no. 3. The rig instructed the vessels to proceed westwards, away from anchor no. 3. During an attempt to manoeuvre the vessel towards the west, at the same time as the chain’s point of attack over the stern roller shifted from the inner starboard towing-pin to the outer port towing-pin, the vessel developed a serious list to port. The engines on the starboard side stopped. The vessel at first righted herself, but soon listed again and at 17:08 rolled over on her port side.
The capsizing happened suddenly and without much warning. Of those on the bridge, only one of the first officers managed to get out. The crew members who had been in the deck area managed to get hold of life-jackets, climb onto the vessel’s side and jump into the sea before she rolled right over. Two persons who had been in the mess got themselves out onto deck and into the sea.
Full alarm was immediately sounded on the rig and the vessels in the area were at once set to searching for survivors. Helicopters from the British coastguard were alerted and arrived on the spot after about an hour. Other vessels in the vicinity also proceeded to the casualty.
The “Bourbon Dolphin” had a crew of 14 persons. Also on board was the master’s 14-year-old son. Seven persons were saved. The bodies of three persons were found in the sea, the remaining five persons are still missing.
The casualty remained some days afloat, bottom-up, until she sank on Sunday 15 April. The “Bourbon Dolphin” has subsequently been located on the seabed, where she is lying in an almost upright position.
1.2 The structure of the report
Most chapters contain partial and main conclusions related to the matters under discussion. The summary ought therefore to be read in conjunction with the main presentation.
Chapter 2 describes the establishment and appointment of the Commission, its qualifications and terms of reference, the work of the Commission of Inquiry, including the implementation of open hearings and the collection of evidence, the use of expert witnesses, the addressing of the adversarial principle and requirements as to public access to documents.
Chapter 3 presents regulatory requirements for anchor-handling vessels and anchor-handling operations. By way of introduction, the international regulations and Norwegian legislation on maritime safety are explained. Thereafter follows a review of the requirements for the vessels’ design and equipment, safety management system, manning and qualifications. Next are reviewed the requirements for control, inspection and certification. An explanation is given of the British regulatory system for anchor-handling operations and of the guidelines for this that the industry organisations have adopted for the North-West European Area. Finally, operational standards for the performance of marine operations and regulatory requirements related to the mooring system for the rig are reviewed.
Chapter 4 provides a description of the company, Bourbon Offshore Norway. The chapter also discusses the crews during the operation, the company’s safety management system, certification and audits.
Chapter 5 gives a factual description of the vessel “Bourbon Dolphin”. Design, construction process and commissioning, the vessel’s tank arrangement, engines, anchor-handling equipment and winch system with emergency release function are reviewed relatively thoroughly. The chapter also discusses the vessel’s stability book and load calculator. Rescue equipment and navigation equipment are additionally dealt with. In conclusion, the vessel’s operating history is described.
Chapter 6 reviews the rig move that the “Bourbon Dolphin” was helping to perform. By way of introduction the Commission will describe the players on the commissioning side – the oil company, the rig company and the consultancy firm, specifications for the rig and an overview of personnel on the rig during the operation. A relatively thorough review of the planning of the rig move is also made – the choice of mooring system and installation method,
requirements for the vessels, weather criteria and risk assessments and plans for alternative situations (contingency planning).
Chapter 7 presents key data for the vessels that were selected by the operator for the rig move.
Chapter 8 provides a review of the rig move up to the capsizing, including the crew change on the “Bourbon Dolphin”.
Chapter 9 presents the incidents that on 12 April 2007 ended with the capsizing of the “Bourbon Dolphin”. First comes an explanation of the running-out of the diagonal anchor (no. 6); then a presentation of the attempt to assist made by another vessel. Then an account of the actual accident is given, including for the external forces that affected the vessel in the decisive phase.
Chapter 10 provides, by way of introduction, an account of the crew’s evacuation. This is followed by a chronological presentation of the rescue operation’s individual phases and implementation, including available resources and use of various rescue aids. The chapter also deals with the roles played by Norwegian authorities and the company during the rescue operation.
Chapter 11 describes the measures taken in an attempt to salvage the casualty. By way of introduction the Commission provides a list of observation of the casualty’s positions. There follows a presentation of occurrences until the signing of the salvage contract, of the bodies involved and the decisions taken along the way.
In Chapter 12 the Commission undertakes summarising analyses and considers the direct and indirect causal relationships and the report’s approach to questions of responsibility.
In Chapter 13 the Commission makes its recommendations.
1.3 Key conclusions
A selection of key conclusions of the report is here presented. The order does not say anything about their importance in relation to the accident and the Commission’s terms of reference.
Key conclusions are:

The vessel was built and equipped as an all-round vessel AHSV (Anchor Handling Supply Vessel). Uniting these functions poses special challenges. In addition to bollard pull, anchor-handling demands thruster capacity, powerful winches, big drums and equipment for handling chain. Supply and cargo operations demand the biggest possible, and also flexible, cargo capacities both on deck and in tanks. The “Bourbon Dolphin” was a relatively small and compact vessel, in which all these requirements were to be united.

The company had no previous experience with the A 102 design and ought therefore to have undertaken more critical assessments of the vessel’s characteristics, equipment and not least operational limitations, both during her construction and during her subsequent operations under various conditions. The company did not pick up on the
fact that the vessel had experienced an unexpected stability-critical incident about two months after delivery.

The vessel’s stability-related challenges were not clearly communicated from shipyard to company and onwards to those who were to operate the vessel.

Under given load conditions the vessel did not have sufficient stability to handle lateral forces. The winch’s pulling-power was over-dimensioned in relation to what the vessel could in reality withstand as regards stability.

The anchor-handling conditions prepared by the shipyard were not realistic. Nor did the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s regulatory system make any requirement that these be approved.

The ISM Code demands procedures for the key operations that the vessel is to perform, Despite the fact that anchor-handling was the vessel’s main function, there was no vessel-specific anchor-handling procedure for the “Bourbon Dolphin”.

The company did not follow the ISM code’s requirement that all risk be identified.

The company did not make sufficient requirements for the crew’s qualifications for demanding operations. The crew’s lack of experience was not compensated for by the addition of experienced personnel.

The master was given 1½ hours to familiarise himself with the crew and vessel and the ongoing operation. In its safety management system the company has a requirement that new crews shall be familiarised with (inducted into) the vessel before they can take up their duties on board. In practice the master familiarises himself by overlapping with another master who knows the vessel, before he himself is given the command.

Neither the company nor the operator ensured that sufficient time was made available for hand-over in the crew change.

The vessel was marketed with continuous bollard pull of 180 tonnes. During an anchor-handling operation, in practice thrusters are always used for manoeuvring and dynamic positioning. The real bollard pull is then materially reduced. The company did not itself investigate whether the vessel was suited to the operation, but left this to the master.

The company did not see to the acquisition of information about the content and scope of the assignment the “Bourbon Dolphin” was set to carry out. The company did not itself do any review of the Rig Move Procedure (RMP) with a view to risk exposure for crew and vessel. The company was thus not in a position to offer guidance.

The Norwegian

classification society Det norske Veritas (DNV) and the Norwegian Maritime Directorate were unable to detect the failures in the company’s systems though their audits.

In specifying the vessel, the operator did not take account of the fact that the real bollard pull would be materially reduced through use of thrusters. In practice the “Bourbon Dolphin” was unsuited to dealing with the great forces to which she was exposed.

The mooring system and the deployment method chosen were demanding to handle and vulnerable in relation to environmental forces.

Planning of the RMP was incomplete. The procedure lacked fundamental and concrete risk assessments. Weather criteria were not defined and the forces were calculated for better weather conditions than they chose to operate in. Defined safety barriers were lacking. It was left to the discretion of the rig and the vessels whether operations should start or be suspended.

In advance of the operation no start-up meeting with all involved parties was held. The vessels did not receive sufficient information about what could be expected of them, and the master misunderstood the vessel’s role.

The procedure demanded the use of two vessels that had to operate at close quarters in different phases during the recovery and deployment of anchors. The increased risk exposure of the vessels was not reflected in the procedure.

The procedure lacked provisions for alternative measures (contingency planning), for example in uncontrollable drifting from the run-out line. Nor were there guidelines for when and in what way such alternative measures should be implemented and what if any risk these would involve.

The deployment of anchor no. 2 was commenced without the considerable drifting during the deployment of the diagonal anchor no. 6 had been evaluated.

Human error on the part of the rig and the vessels during the performance of the operation.

Communication and coordination between the rig and the vessel was defective during the last phase of the operation.

Lack of involvement on the part of the rig when the “Bourbon Dolphin” drifted.

The roll reduction tank was most probably in use at the time of the accident.

The inner starboard towing pin had been depressed and the chain was lying against the outer starboard towing pin. The chain thereby acquired a changed a changed angle of attack.

We’ve added a new page today, under ‘Technical Papers’


‘Will private equity aversely affect the shipping industry?’